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BOOK REVIEW 
JOANNE KELSEY* 
THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA: THE THIRD BALKAN WAR. By 
MISRA GLENNY. New York: Penguin Books. 1992. Pp. 194. 
All of us have had, now and then, a terrible, horrifying dream, a 
nightmare, from which we wake up in the middle of the night or 
at dawn bathed in sweat from the terror we have experienced. We're 
overcome by joy to find that it was only a dream and not reality. 
Sadly, what is happening around us today, this horror, this chaos 
on our soil, in the heart of Europe, at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, this destruction, this killing, this hatred-
this, alas, is no dream but a living nightmare.! 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The nightmare began on June 25, 1991 when the Republic of 
Slovenia, followed shortly thereafter by the Republic of Croatia, de-
clared independence from the Federation of the Republics ofYugosla-
via.2 In response, the Serbian-led Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) in-
vaded Slovenia, sparking the fire that ignited the entire Balkan region. 3 
* Executive Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL. 
1 Boro Todorovic, statement to YUTEL, Nov. 2, 1991, quoted in MISHA GLENNY, THE FALL OF 
YUGOSLAVIA: THE THIRD BALKAN WAR at ix (1992). 
2 A Whirlwind of Hatreds: How the Balkans Broke Up, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1993, at E5 
[hereinafter Whirlwind]. Slovenia's secession arose from its dispute, primarily with Serbia, over 
the future political relationships among the country's republics and provinces. See Richard F. 
Iglar, Comment, The Constitutional Crisis in Yugoslavia and the International Law of SeifDetermi-
nation: Slovenia's and Croatia's Right to Secede, 15 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 213,216 (1992). 
Croatia and Slovenia, supported by Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, and Kosovo, favored a loose 
confederal system, rather than the centralized federal system desired by Serbia, Montenegro, and 
Vojvodina. Id. 
3 This invasion included efforts to seize Slovenia's international border crossings. Whirlwind, 
supra note 2, at E5. Slovenia's militia successfully resisted the attack. Id. The Yugoslav army also 
attacked Croatia, which, having lost 30% of its territory, declared it would continue fighting to 
reclaim it. Sabrina P. Ramet, War in The Balkans, FOREIGN AFF., Fall 1992, at 79, 8l. 
The violence in Croatia and Slovenia and the European Community's recognition of these 
states pushed Bosnia into an abyss. With Croatia and Slovenia under Serbian attack, the Bosnian 
government had three choices: it could remain within the fugoslav Federation and be ruled by 
Serbia, it could accept the territorial division of Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia, or it could 
apply to the United Nations for recognition as an independent state. GLENNY, supra note 1, at 
143. Bosnian-Croats and Moslems, wary of Serbian domination, considered the first solution 
unacceptable; the Moslems, unhappy with the prospect of a division of their country, rejected 
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The ensuing battles,4 the systematic rape of women,5 and the Serbian 
campaign to "ethnically cleanse"6 the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina 
have been documented and publicized in excruciating detail. 
Because observers have lacked sources that accurately depict the 
historical events fueling this violence, few people understand the un-
derlying causes of the bloodshed. The sources that do address this 
subject often lack credibility, leading to misrepresentations and rumors 
that only fan the flames of ethnic hatred. 7 From this perspective, the 
contribution of Misha Glenny'S The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan 
War is readily apparent. The book provides a vivid personal account 
of the events and personalities that led to Europe's first war since 1948.9 
Through a detailed account of his personal interactions with the peo-
ple of the Balkans and their leaders, Glenny provides a foundation for 
the second alternative; and the Serbs, as they fought to create a "greater Serbia," found the third 
proposal unacceptable. See generally id. Each option appeared to lead to armed conflict among 
the different groups. 
In April 1992, just prior to the United States' and European Community's recognition of 
Bosnia-Hercegovina's independence, Serbian nationalists and the fugoslav Army launched their 
attempt to claim the Bosnian territory for Greater Serbia. Whirlwind, supra note 2, at E5. In the 
winter of 1994, despite dozens of cease·fire orders and efforts by the United Nations to end the 
conflict, the fighting still continued. 
4 Mark Weller, Current Developments: The International Response to the Dissolution of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, S6 AM.]. INT'L L. 569, 570, 571-73 (1992). 
5 Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian Law, S7 AM.]. INT'L 
L. 424, 424-25 (1993) (describing rape in Bosnia as deliberate, massive, and egregious). An 
unpublished European Community report described rape as a Serbian war strategy. Arthur H. 
Matthews, Yugoslavia's Waiting Game, WORLD,Jan. 16, 1993, at 12. According to the report, sexual 
assaults against an estimated 20,000 women and children should not "be seen as incidental to 
the main purpose of the aggression, but as serving a strategic purpose in itself." Id.; see also Petition 
Decries Practice of Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina, GAZETTE, Mar. 11, 1993, atA3. The experience 
of one 17·year-old, as described to journalists, is representative: "Mter raping [Marijanal and her 
mother, Serb irregulars carried [her 1 off to a camp in the forest, where she and a group of other 
women were raped repeatedly over several weeks. They finally freed her when she became 
pregnant .... " Bruce W. Nelan, Rumor & Reality, TIME, Aug. 24, 1992, at 46. 
6 The term "ethnic cleansing" has been defined as "the forcible eviction of particular popu-
lations variously defined by their ethnicity and culture, including religion and language, from 
areas that are claimed by other groups." MJ. Rowlands et aI., The Fallacy of Ethnic Territorial 
Claims, INDEPENDENT, May IS, 1993, at 17; see also Ex-Yugoslavia, EC.ONOMIST, Oct. 10, 1992, at 
64. 
7 Ramet, supra note 3, at SO; see also GLENNY, supra note 1, at ISO. 
8 GLENNY, supra note 1. In 1912 and 1913, two separate wars raged through the Balkan 
region-hence Misha Glenny's title choice. For more information on the origins and outcomes 
of these wars, see CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, REPORT OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMISSION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CAUSES AND CONDUCT OF THE BALKAN WARS (1914). 
9 Misha Glenny, the Central Europe correspondent of the BBC's World Service, was stationed 
in Yugoslavia from June through December 1991. He is also the author of THE REBIRTH OF 
HISTORY: EASTERN EUROPE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY (1990). 
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an understanding of the origins of the seemingly in tractable hostilities, 
as well as the reasons for their longevity. 
Glenny's portrayal of the region is realistic and unbiased. He 
subjects all sides of the conflict to a rigid, but fair, inquisition. He 
avoids placing definitive blame for the Balkans tragedy on anyone 
group, but indicates clearly the frailties and misperceptions of them 
all. The Fall of Yugoslavia begins in Knin, a militarily strategic town in 
Croatia, where Glenny's focus on the region's symbolic landmarks 
provides a useful gateway to informed discussions of the ethnic history 
of the region'S population.1o Glenny next travels to Belgrade, where his 
account focuses on Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic's politics, mili-
tary connections, and ultimate rise to power.]] In later chapters of The 
Fall of Yugoslavia, Glenny comments on the factors motivating 
Slovenia's and Croatia's drives for independence12 and the quagmire 
of Bosnia-Hercegovina.13 In his epilogue, Glenny retreats from his 
more provincial focus and provides a global framework outlining the 
competing interests in the Balkans.14 At this point, the difficulties and 
possible futility of using international force to contain the violence in 
the former Yugoslavia become clear. 
II. NEW PERCEPTIONS OF THE CONFLICT 
Glenny'S glimpse into Yugoslavia's past and his details of its pre-
sent provide insight into the factors fueling the current hostilities. By 
focusing on the "real people" of the conflict, Glenny provides an 
individualized analysis of the disastrous consequences of forcing the 
union of people with diverse ethnic, political, and religious views. Such 
a viewpoint may shake some observers' beliefs that the atrocities are 
simply the unjustified, selfish, and one-sided activities of a purely fa-
natical group--the Serbs. 
At the beginning of 1991, Yugoslavia was a federation of six repub-
lics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro, and 
Macedonia; and two autonomous provinces: Vojvodina and KoSOVO.15 
Eight major ethnic populations lived in regions that corresponded 
approximately to the political divisions of the federation,16 and the 
10 GLENNY, supra note 1, at 1-30. 
11 Id. at 31-61. 
12Id. at 62-97. 
13Id. at 138-76. 
14Id. at 177-84. 
15Iglar, supra note 2, at 215 n.21. 
16Id. 
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names of the republics generally corresponded to their majority popu-
lationsP Whereas each region claimed a particular ethnic concentra-
tion, no single ethnic group possessed an absolute majority in Yugosla-
via.18 
Glenny points out that one weakness in the belief that the Serbian 
campaign was unprovoked and irrational is that not all Serbs lived in 
the geographic region designated "Serbia."19 For example, 600,000 
Serbs lived in Croatia.20 The majority were urbanized, shared a symbi-
otic relationship with their Croatian neighbors, and were often re-
ferred to as "Hrbi, a conflation of Hrvati (Croats) and Srbi (Serbs)."21 
According to Glenny, the neighbor-against-neighbor conflict that tore 
through Croatia in 1991 could not have arisen out of such an inte-
grated relationship-there must have been other influences.22 
In particular, Glenny suggests that the heart of the conflict in 
Croatia lies in the contrast between urbanized Serbs and their rural 
relatives.23 In contrast to the highly educated, elite, urban Serbs, it is 
[the] rural Serbs who control the broad swathes of country-
side .... The economic horizons of the rural Serbs are lim-
ited, but the early post-feudal concepts of land and home are 
central to their thinking and sense of security. Passive for 
decades, when they believed their homes were under threat, 
their harmless ignorance transformed into something ex-
tremely dangerous.24 
Key political figures misjudged the exten t of the differences be-
tween these two groups. Glenny contends that the mistake of attribut-
ing similar qualities to both the urban Serbs and their rural counter-
17The province of Kosovo, however, contains an Albanian majority. Id. 
18 BRUCE McFARLANE, YUGOSLAVIA: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY 2 (1988). Few inhabi-
tants of the former Yugoslavia actually consider themselves "Yugoslavians." The 1981 census 
counted 22.4 million people consisting of 9.3 million Serbs, 4.6 million Croats, 4.1 million 
Bosnians, 1.9 million Macedonians, 1.8 million Slovenes, 1.7 million Albanians, 590,000 Mon-
tenegrans, and 470,000 Hungarians. [d. at 2. 
19 See GLENNY, supra note 1, at 2. 
20 Paul Lendvai, Yugoslavia Without Yugoslavs: The Roots of the Crisis, 67 INT'L AFF. 251, 253 
n.5 (1991). 
21 GLENNY, supra note 1, at 3. 
22 One commentator points out that it is a circulating myth, and therefore no justification, 
that this conflict between the Croatian and Serbian people is "centuries old." Ramet, supra note 
3, at 80. She claims that actual violence between the groups did not begin until after World War 
I, which indicates that the people of Yugoslavia lived together peacefully for centuries. [d. 
23 GLENNY, supra note 1, at 3. 
24 [d. 
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parts was most problematic when made by President Franjo Tudman,25 
winner of Croatia's 1990 democratic elections. Tudman viewed the 
seemingly submissive and integrated nature of the urban Serbs as 
representative of all Croatian Serbs.26 Likewise, Tudman's repre-
sentatives in Croatia's rural areas arrogantly assumed that the passivity 
and adaptability of the Serbs living in urban communities reflected the 
values of the entire Serbian community in Croatia. Consequently, they 
handled matters in an indelicate manner.27 This led the rural Serbs to 
believe that the Croats had begun to create the infrastructure of a 
fascist state.28 
Many events support this Serbian belief. Tudman's political meth-
ods, though somewhat democratic, exhibited authoritarian tendencies. 
His obsession with creating a "state which would be identified with the 
Croatian people"29 stood in vivid contrast to the style of former Yugo-
slavian leader Josip Bizo Tito, who had successfully suppressed Serbian-
Croatian enmity during his rule. 30 Each change implemented by Tud-
man further alienated the Serbs living in Croatia and strengthened 
their fears of Croatian domination.3l Tudman, for example, authorized 
the hanging of the red and white shield of Croatian heraldry in public 
locations, demoted many Serbs from high government positions, and 
demanded that literary Croat be the official language of people in 
administrative positions.32 
Tudman's goal of increasing Croatian nationalism and Tito's con-
trasting style of minimizing differences demonstrate two different ap-
proaches to solving the particular conundrum of the Balkan penin-
sula-the choice of either a centralized, federal system of government 
or a loose confederal system would have alienated at least one group. 
Whereas developing a Yugoslav state would have implied the domi-
nance of Serbs over Croats, creating an independent Croatia would 
have implied the dominance of Croats over Serbs.33 Each approach was 
destined to fail. 
25Id. 
26Id. 
27Id. 
28Id. at 12. 
29Id. 
30 !d. at 13. Tito ruled Yugoslavia with a unique brand of liberalized communism, which 
allowed for rival points of view to be voiced in the media. Ramet, supra note 3, at 82. Under his 
rule, the country remained at peace from 1943 to 1980. See id. 
3! GLENNY, supra note 1, at 12. 
32Id. 
33Id. at 13. 
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When Croatia declared its independence in 1991, violence ensued 
as a result of the opposition of the 600,000 Serbians stranded in 
Croatia.34 The neighbor-against-neighbor violence displayed by the 
Croats and Serbs represents only one of the problems created by 
centuries of intertwined ethnic, religious, and political forces in the 
Balkans.35 Rather than serving to unifY the different groups, these 
common threads in the patchwork of Balkan tensions only intensity 
the complexity involved in designing an effective solution to the vio-
lence in the region. 
As cease-fires continue to be broken, a solution involving military 
force grows more likely. Assuming a decision to pursue such a solution, 
the international community would require legal avenues through 
which to implement it. Currently, no precedent exists for intervention 
with force for purely humanitarian purposes. By analyzing the laws 
governing intervention authorized by the United Nations Security 
Council, however, a viable justification for intervention can be devel-
oped. 
III. LEGALITY OF INTERVENTION WITH FORCE 
The Fall of Yugoslavia provides a contextual background against 
which a legal justification for humanitarian intervention can be dis-
cussed. Initially, the most important consideration is whether the 
fighting in Bosnia-Hercegovina should be characterized as a civil war 
or an international conflict. 36 The significance of this distinction origi-
nates in debates on the legality and obligation of outside interven-
tion. 37 Victims of the conflict, as well as outside observers, had lobbied 
34 In contrast, Slovenia seceded relatively painlessly. Id. at 177. Slovenia's peaceful transition 
resulted from both the healthier Slovene economy and the region's strong sense of tradition and 
ethnic homogeneity. Id. at 97. 
35 See Iglar, supra note 2, at 216. 
36 Weller, supra note 4, at 572. A serious threat exists that the conflict in Bosnia will spread 
to Kosovo and Macedonia, thus drawing Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey into the war. 
Ramet, supra note 3, at 80. In fact, in January 1993, Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the Albanians 
in Kosovo traveled to the United States to request the United Nations' intervention in order to 
prevent the "cleansing" drive from spreading. The next probable target of the Serbians is the 
province of Kosovo, where ethnic Albanians constitute a majority. Matthews, supra note 5, at 12. 
37 The debate is wide ranging. For views arguing against the legality of humanitarian inter-
vention, see Farrokh Jhabvala, Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, 21 
IND.]. INT'L L. 208 (1981); Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. 
REv. 1620 (1986). For arguments in favor ofthe legality of humanitarian intervention, see Michael 
]. Bazylar, Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of the Atrocities in 
Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN.]. INT'L L. 547 (1987); Michael]. Levitin, The Law of Force and 
the Force of Law: Grenada, the Falklands, and Humanitarian Intervention, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 621 
(1986). 
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intensively for an effective intervention by the United Nations. Serbian 
leaders, however, never acknowledged the secession of Croatia, 
Slovenia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina. In their opinion, the conflict was a 
civil war.38 As such, the United Nations had neither a right to intervene 
with force nor any precedent for such intervention. 
Alternatively, because the United Nations had admitted the Re-
publics of Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Croatia as new mem-
bers,39 the United Nations may have cleared a path for legal, forceful 
intervention. Under currently accepted international legal principles, 
when a member nation of the United Nations requests outside inter-
vention, other member nations may comply.40 
At least two potential legal justifications exist for the United Na-
tions to intervene with force in the Balkans.4l First, the United Nations 
Security Council may authorize intervention with force. 42 Second, 
when certain conditions exist, other member states may intervene 
under their own authority.43 
A. Intervention Authorized By The United Nations Security Council 
Created at the end of the Second World War, the United Nations 
proposed to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" 
and to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, [and] in the 
dignity and worth of the human person .... "44 Arguably, Cold War 
politics stunted the development and implementation of the United 
Nations' role. Today, however, with the end of the Cold War, the role 
of the Security Council as an instrument of collective security may be 
38HELSINKI WATCH, WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA 47 (1992) [hereinafter WAR 
CRIMES]. 
39GA Res. 236, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 20, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/46/236 
(1992); GA Res. 237, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 20, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/237 
(1992); GA Res. 238, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 20, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/238 
(1992). 
40 See Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy [hereinafter Use of Force], in RiGHT V. 
MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 37, 45 (Council on Foreign Relations ed., 
1989). 
41 Because the United Nations had not recognized these republics as independent member 
nations when Serbian-led forces first invaded their respective territories, an argument could be 
made that this is not an international conflict. Such an argument is questionable, however, 
because the republics have requested aid since their recognition by and admission into the United 
Nations General Assembly. 
42 See Barry M. Benjamin, Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention: Legalizing the Use of Force to 
Prevent Human Rights Atrocities, 16 INT'L LJ. 120, 130 (1992). 
43 See Louis Henkin, Law and War After the Cold War, 15 MD.]' INT'L L. & TRADE 147, 151-55 
(1991) [hereinafter Law and War]. 
HU.N. CHARTER pmbl. 
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considered more seriously.45 Some argue that the Security Council 
remains the institution best designed to carry out the protection of 
human rights.46 
In Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter, member states 
confer the responsibility of maintaining international peace and secu-
rity upon the Security Council, and agree that the Council acts on their 
behalf when it carries out its duties. Under Article 25, member states 
have also agreed to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security 
Council in accordance with the United Nations Charter. 
The Security Council's legal right to intervene in the Bosnia-Her-
cegovina conflict is consistent with its responsibilities under the United 
Nations Charter. Specifically, Article 39 provides that once the Council 
has determined that there has been a breach, or threat of breach, to 
international peace, it can either recommend or decide what measures 
should be taken.47 Under Article 42, if measures not involving the use 
45 The Security Council is composed of five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom) and 10 nonpermanent members. U.N. CHARTER art. 
23. Procedural decisions are now made upon a vote of nine members, but in cases of substantive 
matters, a negative vote by one or more of the permanent members constitutes a veto. U.N. 
CHARTER art. 27; Sydney D. Bailey, The Security Council, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 304, 305 (Philip Alston ed., 1992). Because intervention with force requires the unani-
mous vote of all members of the United Nations Security Council, and during the Cold War it 
was unlikely that the United Nations superpowers-the United States and the U.S.S.R.-would 
agree on substantive matters, the concept of humanitarian intervention never evolved. The only 
exception to this was the Security Council's action during the Korean War, which occurred only 
because the "Soviets were absent from the Council, having voluntarily left their seat vacant in 
protest over the Council's refusal to seat the Chinese communists instead of the Chinese nation-
alists." JOSEPH M. SWEENEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 1305 (3d ed. 1988). 
46 See generally Law and War, supra note 43, at 158--66. But see Alan K Henrikson, How Can 
the Vision of a 'New World Order' Be Realized?, FLETCHER FORUM WORLD AFF., Winter 1992, at 
66--67 (suggesting that alternatives to United Nations Security Council action be tested). 
The Persian Gulf War represented a turning point for the United Nations Security Council. 
The collective action taken under the aegis of the United Nations in that conflict has been hailed 
as "a vindication of international law and of the principle of collective security." Oscar Schachter, 
United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM.]. INT'L L. 452,452 (1991). Although most nations 
recognize that a new world order "based on the rule of law" may be a distant prospect there is a 
sense of renewed hope that the Security Council will be taken seriously as an instrument of 
collective responsibility. Id. 
47 Article 39 provides that" [tl he Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 39. Article 41 provides: 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed 
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the 
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include com-
plete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, 
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of dip-
lomatic relations. 
U.N. CHARTER art. 4l. 
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of armed force are inadequate to resolve the conflict, the Council has 
the right to resort to the use of air, land, and sea forces.48 
As Glenny indicates, the Balkan conflict has the potential to reach 
international proportions because "[t]he re-emergence not simply of 
old Balkan conflicts but of local and more international alliances and 
strategies implies considerable danger for the stability of southern 
Europe, central and eastern Europe and the Mediterranean."49 The 
United Nations Security Council, therefore, has sufficient reason to 
intervene in the regional conflict. As impatient member states await 
significant Security Council intervention, however, the legality of uni-
lateral state intervention based on humanitarian measures must also 
be explored. 
B. Intervention By Member States 
International law governing the right of United Nations member 
states independently to use force against other nations is based in 
Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter. 50 This article provides that 
"[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations." It is generally agreed that a violation 
of this article occurs whenever a state enters the territory of another 
state by force, for any purpose, and for any length of time.51 
One explicit exception to the constraints of the article is the use 
of force against another state in self-defense.52 During the Cold War, 
48 Article 42 provides: 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would 
be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, 
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations 
by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations. 
U.N. CHARTER art. 42. 
The Council's decisions are binding, however, only if a formal determination is made under 
Article 39 or if words from that Article, but not synonyms, are incorporated into a decision of 
the Council. Bailey, supra note 45, at 305. United Nations members have in theory agreed to 
accept and carry out the Council's decisions. U.N. CHARTER art. 25. When the Council decides 
on provisional, nonmilitary, or military measures, United Nations members are expected to 'Join 
in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures .... " U.N. CHARTER art. 49. 
49 GLENNY, supra note I, at 183. 
50 Law and War, supra note 43, at 149. In principle, sending forces into the territory of 
another state does not violate the laws of the Charter when those forces have been legitimately 
invited. Id. at 148-49. The question of which legitimate government may legally invite outside 
forces into Bosnia-Hercegovina is beyond the scope of this review. 
51 Id. at 149-50. 
52 Article 51 provides in part: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right 
of the individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
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certain other "benign" exceptions were also suggested, although none 
were formally accepted_ These include the use of force to support 
self-determination,53 intervention for socialism,54 intervention for de-
mocracy,55 and intervention for humanitarian purposes_56 
The argument in favor of allowing humanitarian intervention is 
based on the simple premise that the Charter's framers could not 
possibly have intended to forbid a state from penetrating another state 
with armed forces in order to save human lives_57 Although this is a 
noble interpretation, as of 1993 the only viable exception to Article 
2 (4) in the area of humanitarian intervention has been the Entebbe 
principle_58 This limited exception allows a state to use limited force if 
necessary to rescue hostages_59 Attempts to extend this principle be-
yond the use of minimal force-for example, to justifY the use of force 
to destroy repressive governments-have been rejected_ 60 
One argument against humanitarian intervention in the Balkans 
is an interpretation of the Charter that posits that once the Security 
Council has taken action regarding a conflict, individual member 
nations lose the right to intervene absent specific instructions from the 
Counci1.61 As mentioned above, it could be argued that the Council's 
actions in the Balkan conflict-calling for cease-fires, structuring em-
bargoes, and recognizing the crisis as a threat to international peace-
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
53 See Use of Force, supra note 40, at 47. Although the definition of self-determination remains 
unclear, many experts agree that it includes, at a minimum, "the right of peoples in Asia and 
Mrica to be free from Colonial domination, Western style." Id. The debate centers on whether 
external powers may intervene with force in the context of expelling colonial domination. Id. 
Experts note that in the modern world, pressure for such an exception has diminished, and, 
therefore, "the potential significance of such an exception ... is sharply reduced." Id. at 43. 
54Id. The basis tenet of this so-called Brezhnev doctrine is the right of any socialist state to 
intervene in another state where socialism is threatened. Id. 
55Id. at 44. The basic tenet of this so-called Reagan doctrine is the right of an out~ide state 
to use force to preserve or impose democracy in another state. Id. 
56 Id. 
57 See Law and War, supra note 43, at 157. 
58Id. at 151. 
59Id. 
60 See id. The United States invoked, inter alia, the right to use force to save lives as 
justification for invading and replacing the governments of Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989. 
Id. Vietnam made a similar claim to justiry replacing the prior regime in Cambodia. The 
international legal community rejected all these attempts to justify international aggression. Id. 
61 Taken literally, this language prevents a nation from defending itself beyond its borders, 
even in situations where the aggressor nation ignores the Council's mandates. Schachter, supra 
note 46, at 458; P. Lewis, U.S. Preparing Draft on Claims Against Baghdad, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 
1990, at A12. In contrast, another interpretation of Article 51 recognizes that the Security 
Council's authority includes requiring an armed action to cease. &hachter, supra note 46, at 458. 
This would occur at the Council's discretion, however, and not as a mandatory consequence of 
every Council action. Id. 
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constituted intervention sufficient to preclude individual member na-
tions from acting on their own.62 Nonetheless, the ambiguity over 
interpretations of the United Nations Charter, as well as the possibility 
for ethnic conflict elsewhere in the world, establish strong justifications 
for creating a new exception to Article 2 (4) authorizing humanitarian 
in tervention. 63 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Had they so chosen, the United Nations could have found a legal 
justification for intervening with force in the Balkan conflict. Instead, 
for over two years, the United Nations authorized only limited, benign 
intervention. Although the justification for allowing human rights vio-
lations to continue remains elusive, The Fall of Yugoslavia provides a 
starting point for understanding the factors underlying the United 
Nations' decisions. 
Unfortunately, the Balkan conflict is not an isolated incident. With 
half the world's population being denied fundamental human rights,64 
conflicts similar to those occurring in the Balkans-based on historical 
animosity and ethnic, religious, and political differences-inevitably 
will erupt in the form of genocide and massive human rights violations. 
International leaders must respond with more effective tools of deter-
rence. As Glenny concludes, "[t]hroughout the Cold War, only poorly 
funded human rights organizations addressed this problem [of nation-
alist disputes concerning a minority population] with any seriousness. 
If the problems of the Balkans and the former Soviet Union are to be 
solved, politicians and diplomats must consider [these disputes] with 
equal gravity."65 By highlighting the complex factors involved in design-
ing an effective solution to a war based in historical ethnic conflict, 
Misha Glenny's account reemphasizes the need for the international 
community to become more proactive in both discouraging ethnic 
conflicts before they start and ending them quickly once they have 
begun. 
62 See e.g., U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. SjRESj713 (1991), reprinted 
in 31 I.L.M. 1431 (arms embargo); U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3018th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc SjResj721 
(1991), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1433 (peacekeeping operations); U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3023d mtg. 
at 3., U.N. Doc. SjRESj724 (1991), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1435 (humanitarian aid and other 
United Nations actions). For a detailed description of Security Council actions in the conflict, 
see WAR CRIMES, supra note 38, at 145-71. 
63 A humanitarian intervention exception could use international human rights law as its 
normative base. On the importance of international human rights at both the national and global 
levels, see generally Richard B. Bilder, Rethinking International Human Rights: Some Basic Ques-
tions, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 171. 
64 UN: Rights Denied Half World's People, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 19, 1993, at A53. 
65 GLENNY, supra note 1, at 184. 



